Colly R&D Risk MCP Installer

Scope

This Skill supports Windows clients that can reach 192.168.30.136 on the trusted LAN or approved VPN. The fixed MCP endpoint and OAuth resource are both https://192.168.30.136/mcp.

The shared layer performs LAN, pinned-CA, current-user trust-store, and HTTPS health checks. It does not assume a client product or write an unknown client's configuration.

Do not adapt this workflow to DEAP or another vendor-cloud executor: those services cannot directly route to this private endpoint and may reject it through SSRF protection.

Capability routing

Select a capability mode, not a product name:

1. Use ConnectionProfile when the consuming client is unknown, undocumented, or only needs the server/OAuth/TLS contract. This is the safe fallback.
2. Use NativeHttpOAuth only when the client supports Streamable HTTP, OAuth discovery, DCR, PKCE S256, RFC 8707 resource, refresh tokens, and an explicit-port loopback HTTP callback.
3. Use StdioOAuthProxy when the client supports local STDIO configuration but cannot complete remote interactive OAuth. This generates a pinned third-party local proxy configuration and requires user review before import.
4. Use Preflight for network, CA, and HTTPS diagnosis without producing a client connection artifact.
5. Use Codex, WorkBuddy, or TraeWork only as optional convenience presets when the actual host is known and the user wants its specific configuration mutation. Never choose a preset merely because its executable or directory exists.

Read Local environment and troubleshooting before running a mode. Then read only the selected mode guide: Connection profile, Native HTTP OAuth, or STDIO OAuth proxy. Product-specific behavior remains in Codex, WorkBuddy, and TraeWork.

Execution workflow

Use the public dispatcher from a foreground PowerShell session:

powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "<skill-directory>\scripts\configure_colly_mcp.ps1" -Mode ConnectionProfile
powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "<skill-directory>\scripts\configure_colly_mcp.ps1" -Mode NativeHttpOAuth
powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "<skill-directory>\scripts\configure_colly_mcp.ps1" -Mode StdioOAuthProxy

Unknown clients default to ConnectionProfile at the Skill decision layer; the script itself still requires an explicit -Mode so side effects are auditable. Do not claim that the client-neutral profile is a standardized MCP import format. MCP standardizes protocol and OAuth behavior, not every client's configuration path, JSON/TOML schema, CLI, approval UI, or reload lifecycle.

The user's request to install this specific MCP authorizes adding its pinned public CA to the current-user trust store and writing artifacts under the dedicated local Colly adapter directory. It does not authorize guessing or modifying an unknown client's configuration, installing another product, inserting static credentials, or claiming generated artifacts have already been imported or authenticated.

The bootstrap compares the process identity profile with the target interactive Windows profile. If they differ, a real run must stop before certificate or artifact mutation; rerun through the host approval mechanism in a foreground process as the target Windows user.

The user must personally select or scan the DingTalk account and approve the listed scopes. Never automate account selection, enter credentials, or treat a browser page load as successful authorization.

If an entry already exists with a conflicting endpoint, transport, generated artifact, or static authorization header, stop without printing credential values or overwriting it automatically. Never create a Bug, task, Story, notification, or configuration change as an installation test.

Authorization boundary

Request only the ordinary-user baseline scopes:

risk:read,zentao:bug:create,zentao:task:create,zentao:story:create

Do not request risk:write, risk:notify, or risk:admin during normal installation. DingTalk OAuth identifies the MCP user; personal ZenTao authorization is a separate later step used only for a confirmed Bug, task, or Story creation. Never request or handle passwords, cookies, OAuth tokens, API tokens, or browser sessions.

Certificate rules

• Download only the fixed LAN CA URL over a direct connection. Do not follow redirects, accept more than 16 KiB, or treat plaintext transport as trusted.
• Trust the public root only after its pinned file SHA-256 and certificate DER SHA-256 match and the certificate is a currently valid CA.
• Import into Cert:\CurrentUser\Root; never search for or distribute Caddy private keys.
• Never use insecure TLS, copied Bearer tokens, browser cookies, renamed certificate assets, or embedded PEM/Base64 as a workaround.
• If validation fails, stop and require the administrator to repair the LAN endpoint or publish updated fingerprints.

Completion response

Report the selected capability mode and separately state network, CA trust, artifact generation or preset mutation, OAuth, and same-session read-only verification.

Use these states precisely:

• prepared: connection artifacts exist;
• imported: the consuming client accepted them;
• authenticated: the user's loopback OAuth completed;
• verified: that exact client session successfully called read-only get_status.

Then summarize the actual authorized capability groups from Capabilities, noting that ZenTao writes still require the applicable personal authorization and server-side confirmation contract.