SKILL: HTTP Request Smuggling — Expert Attack Playbook

> AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert HTTP desync techniques. Covers CL.TE, TE.CL, TE.TE obfuscation variants, HTTP/2 downgrade and pseudo-header confusion, client-side desync (browser fetch pipelines), and tool-assisted fuzzing. Assumes familiarity with raw HTTP/1.1 framing and reverse-proxy topologies. This is not “header injection” — it is message boundary disagreement between hops.

Routing note: load this skill when you suspect CDN/reverse-proxy and origin disagree on request-end boundaries, or when abnormal concatenation appears during H2-to-H1 downgrade.

0. RELATED ROUTING

• ghost-bits-cast-attack when the HTTP client library is Apache HttpClient <= 4.5.9 (HTTPCLIENT-1974/1978) — injecting 瘍瘊 (U+760D U+760A, low bytes \r\n) into a header value causes the underlying char-to-byte writer to emit a literal CRLF, splitting the request at the origin without relying on CL/TE disagreement

1. QUICK START

CL.TE first probe (front-end trusts CL, back-end trusts chunked)

Assumption: front end prioritizes Content-Length, back end prioritizes Transfer-Encoding: chunked. Use a very short CL so the front end accepts a fake end, while the back end continues chunk parsing and leaves remaining bytes for the next request.

POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: target.example
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 13
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

0

SMUGGLED

• Front end reads only 13 bytes based on Content-Length: 13 (that is, 0\r\n\r\nSMUGGLED, 13 bytes total) and considers the request complete.
• Back end parses as chunked: after the 0 end chunk, it treats SMUGGLED and onward as the start byte stream of the next request.

TE.CL first probe (front-end trusts chunked, back-end trusts CL)

Assumption: front end parses chunked and back end only reads Content-Length. Set **CL equal to the number of bytes in the ch

（为兼容发布已截断）