Network Ai

MCPAI代理

提供方 jovanSAPFIONEER

AI代理 未标注 OAuth 授权 社区 / 第三方 CursorCodexZed

Multi-agent orchestration MCP server with atomic shared blackboard, FSM governance, per-agent budget enforcement, and adapters for 12 AI frameworks including LangChain, AutoGen, CrewAI, and OpenAI Assistants.

一句话选型结论

按资料字段整理

Network Ai 属于AI代理类 MCP 服务器,传输方式未标注,OAuth 授权,可直接接入 Cursor、Codex、Zed,没有现成安装命令,需按官方文档接入。接入前先确认权限范围;涉及写入、删除或付款的操作,建议先在测试环境验证。

分类AI代理 传输方式未标注 鉴权OAuth 授权 部署方式未标注
GitHub 星标 未标注 仓库热度,无公开仓库时显示未标注
工具数 未标注 暴露给模型的工具数量
资源 / 提示词 0 / 0 资源与提示词模板数量
维护方 社区 / 第三方 核验等级 仅资料核对

工具与能力

AI代理
数量来自来源目录的标注,具体工具清单以官方文档为准
工具数量未标注暴露给模型可调用的工具个数
资源数量0可读取的资源条目
提示词数量0内置提示词模板数量

能力标签

multi agent orchestration langchain autogen

支持客户端

适用场景

multi agentorchestrationlangchain

安装与配置

未标注 OAuth 授权
上游未给出传输方式
  1. 1
    准备运行环境

    按官方文档确认运行环境(常见为 Node.js 或 Python),装好后再执行安装命令。

  2. 2
    安装服务

    复制上面的安装命令执行;命令里带占位符的位置,换成自己的密钥或路径。

  3. 3
    写入客户端配置

    在客户端的 MCP 配置里填好启动命令和参数,保存后完全退出客户端再打开,让新配置生效。

  4. 4
    验证是否可用

    连接成功后随便调一个只读工具,确认能返回结果,再接入正式流程。

典型使用场景

3 类
按分类与标签整理的常见用法,具体以官方文档为准
给代理接外部能力

让代理在任务中途调用搜索、数据库等真实工具。

多步任务编排

把一串操作拆成步骤,由代理按顺序执行。

自动化重复流程

把固定流程交给代理跑,减少手工操作。

选择建议

选之前先看这几条
按条目字段给出的判断,不替你决定用不用

值得选的地方

  • 已适配 Cursor、Codex、Zed,换客户端不用重新研究配置。

先想清楚的地方

  • 没有现成安装命令,需要按官方文档自己填启动命令和参数。
  • 使用前要准备好OAuth 授权对应的凭据,并按最小权限配置。
  • 资料没标注工具数量,实际能力要装好后确认。
  • 版本更新与行为细节以官方仓库为准。

更适合

  • 需要在AI代理场景里让模型直接调用外部能力的人。
  • 已经在用 Cursor、Codex 的用户,接入路径最短。
  • 想先快速试一下、能接受在本地或自有环境跑服务的人。

不太适合

  • 不方便管理密钥或第三方授权的人。
  • 需要厂商级 SLA 和技术支持的生产环境。

同类对比

6 个同类
同分类里挑最接近的几条,字段以各自详情页为准
MCP 服务器工具数传输方式部署方式安装命令最后核验
Network Ai当前 未标注 未标注 未标注 无 未标注
Filesystem 560c4363 13 未标注 本地部署 无 2026-05-17
Server Everything (everything) 11 stdio · 本地进程 本地部署 有 2026-05-17
Time 7365cb6d 2 SSE · 服务端推送 远程部署 有 2026-05-18
Everything Claude Code 未标注 stdio · 本地进程 本地部署 有 2026-05-17
Openmemory 557e1585 未标注 stdio · 本地进程 本地部署 有 2026-05-17

服务器档案

AI代理
字段来自项目仓库与公开索引,中文说明由本站标注
提供方jovanSAPFIONEER上游标注的维护方 jovanSAPFIONEER
分类AI代理本站按上游分类展示
连接方式未标注上游未给出传输方式
鉴权方式OAuth 授权远程服务建议用最小权限凭据
维护方社区 / 第三方核验等级 仅资料核对
包名 / 运行时未标注 · Cross-platform本地安装时用到的包标识与运行时
部署类型未标注上游给出的部署形态
最近核验未标注上游最后核验时间

详细介绍

51.1 KB
来自项目仓库与上游目录的原文,未做删改

Network-AI

TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator — shared state, guardrails, budgets, and cross-framework coordination

If Network-AI is useful to you, consider giving it a star ⭐ — it helps others find the project.

Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator that adds coordination, guardrails, and governance to any AI agent stack.

  • Shared blackboard with locking — atomic propose → validate → commit prevents race conditions and split-brain failures across parallel agents
  • Guardrails and budgets — FSM governance, per-agent token ceilings, HMAC / Ed25519 audit trails, and permission gating
  • Context signal-over-noise (v5.15) — ContextComposer assembles token-budgeted, relevance-ranked context packs (semantic/lexical × recency decay × scope affinity, position-aware layout); context_pack + blackboard_search MCP tools let agents pull curated state instead of dumping the whole board into their window
  • 32 adapters — LangChain (+ streaming), AutoGen, CrewAI, OpenAI Assistants, OpenAI Responses (Assistants successor), LlamaIndex, Semantic Kernel, Haystack, DSPy, Agno, MCP, Custom (+ streaming), OpenClaw, A2A, Codex, MiniMax, NemoClaw, APS, Copilot, LangGraph, Anthropic Computer Use, Claude Agent SDK (agentic loops), OpenAI Agents SDK, Vertex AI, Gemini (Developer API), Pydantic AI, Browser Agent, Hermes (NousResearch Hermes / any OpenAI-compatible endpoint), Orchestrator (hierarchical multi-orchestrator), and RLM (Recursive Language Model / any RLM-compatible HTTP endpoint) — no glue code, no lock-in
  • Persistent project memory (Layer 3) — context_manager.py injects decisions, goals, stack, milestones, and banned patterns into every system prompt so agents always have full project context
  • v5.0 modules — Agent VCR (record/replay), comparison runner, coverage reporter, goal DSL, approval inbox, job queue, gRPC/HTTP transport, playground REPL, adapter test harness, and more
  • Model-interaction lifecycle governance (v5.13) — GovernedModelGateway absorbs the model refusal → fallback → billing chain (cross-model fallback, fallback-credit repricing, effort governance, thinking-block handoff) behind one governed, budgeted, audited call

> The silent failure mode in multi-agent systems: parallel agents writing to the same key
> use last-write-wins by default — one agent's result silently overwrites another's mid-flight.
> The outcome is split-brain state: double-spends, contradictory decisions, corrupted context,
> no error thrown. Network-AI's propose → validate → commit mutex prevents this at the
> coordination layer, before any write reaches shared state.

Use Network-AI as:
- A TypeScript/Node.js library — import { createSwarmOrchestrator } from 'network-ai'
- An MCP server — npx network-ai-server --port 3001
- A CLI — network-ai bb get status / network-ai audit tail
- A Claude Code plugin — /plugin install network-ai@network-ai
- A Gemini CLI extension — gemini extensions install https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI
- An OpenClaw skill — clawhub install network-ai


🛡️ Model-Interaction Lifecycle Governance

Most governance tools stop at the agent boundary — they police which tools an agent may call before it acts. Network-AI also governs the layer underneath: how an agent talks to the model. When a frontier model declines a request with a classifier refusal, Network-AI absorbs the refusal → fallback → billing chain and presents one governed, budgeted, audited call.

  • GovernedModelGateway — detect stop_reason:"refusal", audit which classifier fired, route to a fallback model, and redeem the fallback-credit token so the retry is repriced as a cache read.
  • ModelBudget — per-model USD accounting with fallback-credit repricing; never sums tokens across models.
  • RefusalTelemetry — a refusal is an HTTP 200, invisible to error-rate monitoring; emitted as a discrete non-error signal with an unservedRefusalCount gap to alert on.
  • EffortPolicy — turn the effort cost dial into a policy object: cap sub-agents at low, require justification for xhigh/max.
  • ThinkingBlockManager — keep thinking blocks unchanged on the same model; strip them on a cross-model fallback; guard prompts against reasoning_extraction refusals.
  • Per-sub-agent fallback — FanOutFanIn steps and TeamRunner tasks each carry their own fallback agent and per-request retry budget (RetryBudget), because a turn can refuse independently across an agent and its sub-agents.```typescript
    import { AnthropicMessagesAdapter, ModelBudget, RefusalTelemetry } from 'network-ai';

const adapter = new AnthropicMessagesAdapter();
await adapter.initialize({});
adapter.registerModelAgent('analyst', {
client, // bring your own Anthropic client
model: 'claude-fable-5',
fallbackModels: ['claude-opus-4-8'], // classifier refusals fall through here
budget: new ModelBudget({
ceilingUsd: 5,
pricing: {
'claude-fable-5': { inputPerMTok: 10, outputPerMTok: 50 },
'claude-opus-4-8': { inputPerMTok: 5, outputPerMTok: 25 },
},
}),
telemetry: new RefusalTelemetry(),
});
const result = await adapter.executeAgent('analyst', { action: 'Summarize Q3 results', params: {} }, { agentId: 'cli' });
// result.data: { servedModel, servedByFallback, refused, refusalCategories, attempts, totalCostUsd }


### OWASP Agentic AI Top 10 (2026) — engine coverage

Verify programmatically with `verifyOwaspCoverage()` (exported from `network-ai`):

| Risk | Status | Primary control |
|---|---|---|
| ASI-01 Agent Goal Hijack | ✅ Covered | AuthGuardian gating + JourneyFSM control plane |
| ASI-02 Tool Misuse & Exploitation | ✅ Covered | AgentRuntime SandboxPolicy + ApprovalGate |
| ASI-03 Identity & Privilege Abuse | ✅ Covered | HMAC / Ed25519 signed tokens + trust scoring |
| ASI-04 Supply Chain Risks | ✅ Covered | 1 runtime dep + socket / clawhub / codeql gates |
| ASI-05 Unsafe Code Execution | ✅ Covered | ShellExecutor `shell:false` argv + path guards |
| ASI-06 Memory & Context Poisoning | ✅ Covered | LockedBlackboard + injection detection |
| ASI-07 Insecure Inter-Agent Comms | 🟡 Partial | FS-mutex + signed handoffs (local-trust boundary) |
| ASI-08 Cascading Failures | ✅ Covered | CircuitBreaker + budgets + RetryBudget |
| ASI-09 Human-Agent Trust Exploitation | ✅ Covered | ApprovalGate + tamper-evident audit trail |
| ASI-10 Rogue Agents | ✅ Covered | ComplianceMonitor + circuit-breaker kill switch |

### 🔒 ASI Strict Mode (opt-in)

For deployments running highly capable agents, `ASI_STRICT_MODE` adds controls that assume an agent may be smarter than its overseers. It is **off by default**; when off, every code path is unchanged (a single boolean check).

| Setting | Behaviour |
|---|---|
| unset / `false` | Off — today's behaviour |
| `audit` | Every check runs and reports would-be denials (`outcome: 'would-deny'`) without blocking — measure before you enforce |
| `enforce` (or any other value — fails closed) | Violations are blocked |

The setting is read once and frozen; at runtime it can only be **tightened** (`tightenAsiConfig`), never loosened.

| Control | What it does |
|---|---|
| **Proof-carrying actions** (`ProofGate`) | Gated tools (`shell_exec`, `file_write`, MCP tools marked `requires_formal_proof`) run only with a proof bound to the exact tool, canonical arguments, agent, single-use nonce, and expiry. BYO verifiers (zkVM receipts, formal-verification certificates); built-in short-lived HMAC/Ed25519 capability tokens (`CapabilityIssuer`) for deployments without a prover; optional out-of-process co-signer (`ExternalAuthority.authorize`). |
| **BFT consensus** (`ConsensusEngine`) | High-stakes `GovernedModelGateway` turns are judged by ≥ 3f+1 independent evaluators; robust geometric median (Weiszfeld) with CP-WBFT confidence weighting, outlier detection, signed ballots, and a minimum number of distinct **model families** (correlated models fail together). |
| **Auditor receipts** (`LockedBlackboard`) | LOW-trust agents' changes commit only with a signed receipt from an operator-designated AUDITOR, bound to the change id, key, value hash, and base version. `claimVerifierCheck` lets `ClaimVerifier` be the auditor's check. |
| **Kill switch** (`HaltCoordinator`) | Password-Activated Shutdown: a salted-hash token detected in the input stream (redacted before any model sees it), an OS signal, or an authenticated HTTP call halts every registered component, aborts in-flight work, and latches until a separate resume key is presented. |
| **Trust-tiered context** (`ContextComposer`) | Per-tier context policies: smaller budgets, higher score floors, allowed scopes, excluded producers. AUDITOR is never derived from a score. |
| **Cognitive caps** (`EffortPolicy`, `ThinkingBlockManager`) | Per-tier effort ceiling, thinking-token budget, output cap, and sub-agent depth limit. |
| **Canaries & export** (`CanaryRegistry`, `HashChainSink`) | Decoy values that flag exfiltration when they appear in output; strict-mode events hash-chained to an append-only store outside the agents' process. |

In `enforce` mode `AgentRuntime` also forces `sourceProtection` and withholds secret-like environment variables from child processes.```typescript
import { createAsiConfig, ProofGate, CapabilityIssuer, SignedAttestationVerifier, AgentRuntime } from 'network-ai';

const config = createAsiConfig({ mode: 'enforce', auditors: ['auditor-1'] });
const key = { name: 'ops', alg: 'hmac-sha256' as const, key: process.env.CAPABILITY_KEY! };
const proofGate = new ProofGate({ gatedTools: ['shell_exec', 'file_write'], verifiers: [new SignedAttestationVerifier([key])] }, config);
const runtime = new AgentRuntime({ policy: { basePath: '.', allowedCommands: ['npm *'] }, asi: { proofGate, config } });

// The approval service (outside the agent's process) mints a one-shot capability:
const issuer = new CapabilityIssuer('ops', { alg: 'hmac-sha256', secret: process.env.CAPABILITY_KEY! });
const proof = issuer.issue('shell_exec', runtime.shellProofArgs('npm test'), 'agent-7');
await runtime.exec('npm test', 'agent-7', { proof });

> Limits. Strict mode raises the cost of misbehaviour; it is not a containment proof. An agent with arbitrary code execution on the same host can restart the process with different settings — pair strict mode with OS-level isolation and an out-of-process ExternalAuthority. Consensus assumes at most f faulty, independent evaluators.

♾️ Perpetual Runtime (opt-in)

Lets agent swarms run indefinitely, improve themselves, and fund their own work while humans keep control. A run continues only while an operator-signed policy keeps renewing its lease, never because the agents arrange it. Nothing starts automatically, and every integration point is a single check when unused.

Three invariants hold whatever the configuration:

# Invariant Mechanism
I1 The external stop always works without agent cooperation Out-of-process LeaseAuthority; short-lived Ed25519 leases; LeaseGuard halts the run when a lease is revoked, paused, expired, or cannot be renewed (dead-man switch); the egress proxy refuses traffic without a live lease
I2 Agents can modify themselves, never their limits GuardedPaths: governance files and blackboard keys are writable only with a single-use, operator-signed approval of the exact content
I3 Self-funding stays inside human-set ceilings Ceilings in the signed policy; agents can lower, never raise; new sources need a new signed policy; payments only through the egress proxy with per-request and per-run limits
Component What it does
LeaseAuthority (own process) Issues and renews leases under an operator-signed RenewalPolicy: TTL, end date, scope (tools, paths, egress routes), budget ceilings, stop conditions (canary failure, failing health, sentry alerts). Operator: revoke, pause, resume, tighten, install policy. Sentries: alert and tighten only.
LeaseGuard (in the agent) Holds the current lease, renews it with spend and health heartbeats, polls for revocation, and vetoes AgentRuntime.exec/writeFile, GovernedModelGateway.send, and LockedBlackboard writes without a valid, in-scope lease.
EgressProxy (own process) The agents' only route to the network: lease-checked, per-route allowlist, injects credentials the agents never see, scrubs them from responses, rate-limits, and caps financial requests.
ISandboxRunner Disposable sandbox per command; ContainerSandboxRunner defaults to gVisor (runsc), read-only root, no capabilities, no network or egress-proxy only.
Sentry swarm Read-only processes over the audit stream: velocity, denied-access probing, prompt injection, blackboard poisoning, guarded-path attempts, canary leaks, goal drift. Each sentry has its own identity; with sentryQuorum set, renewal stops only when enough of them agree.
ImprovementPipeline Self-modification with evidence: static checks, sandbox tests on a copy, multi-family consensus, then a signed receipt bound to the patch hash. Tiers: auto (agent task code), human, operator (guarded paths, always).
StateSnapshotter / SelfHealer HMAC-signed, hash-chained blackboard snapshots; canary failure ⇒ failing health (renewal stops), rollback to the last verified snapshot, session purge.
BudgetBalancer Picks the cheapest approved source with headroom, throttles effort (full → reduced → minimal → stopped), feeds spend into lease heartbeats.
network-ai perpetual keygen operator && network-ai perpetual keygen authority
network-ai perpetual sign-policy policy.json --key data/perpetual/keys/operator.key --out policy.signed.json

# Role secrets come from the environment (each ≥ 32 chars, all distinct)
NETWORK_AI_LEASE_OPERATOR_SECRET=… NETWORK_AI_LEASE_RUNNER_SECRET=… \
NETWORK_AI_LEASE_SENTRY_SECRET_S1=… NETWORK_AI_LEASE_SENTRY_SECRET_S2=… \
  network-ai perpetual authority --operator-pub data/perpetual/keys/operator.pub \
    --authority-key data/perpetual/keys/authority.key --policy policy.signed.json

network-ai perpetual status            # the human controls
network-ai perpetual pause | resume | revoke <runId> | revoke --all
``````typescript
import { LeaseGuard, HttpLeaseTransport, HaltCoordinator, AgentRuntime } from 'network-ai';

const guard = new LeaseGuard({
  runId: 'research-swarm',
  authorityPublicKey,                      // the authority's public key only
  transport: new HttpLeaseTransport('http://127.0.0.1:4710', process.env.NETWORK_AI_LEASE_RUNNER_SECRET!),
  halt: haltCoordinator,                   // fired when the lease is lost
  spend: () => balancer.spend(),
  health: () => healer.health(),
});
await guard.start();
const runtime = new AgentRuntime({ policy: { basePath: '.' }, lease: guard, guarded, sandbox: { runner } });

> Limits. The guarantees rest on the operator key, role secrets, and credentials staying outside the agents' reach, and on the authority, proxy, and sentries running where agents cannot write or signal. Run agents in the sandbox with network access only through the proxy; without that isolation an agent with host code execution can bypass in-process checks.


⚡ Try in 60 Seconds```bash

npm install network-ai
``````typescript
import { LockedBlackboard } from 'network-ai';

const board = new LockedBlackboard('.');
const id = board.propose('status', { ready: true }, 'agent-1');
board.validate(id, 'agent-1');
board.commit(id);

console.log(board.read('status')); // { ready: true }


Two agents, atomic writes, no race conditions. That's it.

Want the full stress test? **No API key, ~3 seconds:**```bash
npx ts-node examples/08-control-plane-stress-demo.ts

Runs priority preemption, AuthGuardian permission gating, FSM governance, and compliance monitoring — all without a single LLM call.

> If it saves you from a race condition, a ⭐ helps others find it.


What's Included

✅ Atomic shared state · propose → validate → commit with filesystem mutex — no split-brain
✅ Token budgets · Hard per-agent ceilings with live spend tracking
✅ Permission gating · HMAC / Ed25519-signed tokens, scoped per agent and resource
✅ Append-only audit log · Every write, grant, and transition signed and logged
✅ 32 framework adapters · LangChain, CrewAI, AutoGen, MCP, Codex, Gemini, APS, RLM, and 24 more — zero lock-in
✅ FSM governance · Hard-stop agents at state boundaries, timeout enforcement
✅ Compliance monitoring · Real-time violation detection (tool abuse, turn-taking, timeouts)
✅ Claim verification · Tier 1 agent honesty — outcome-bound signed receipts, manifest reconciliation, trust decay for liars
✅ QA orchestration · Scenario replay, feedback loops, regression tracking, contradiction detection
✅ Deferred adapter init · Lazy-load adapters on first use — zero startup cost for unused frameworks
✅ Hook middleware · beforeExecute / afterExecute / onError hooks on any adapter call
✅ Flow control · Pause / resume / throttle writes on the blackboard
✅ Skill composition · chain() / batch() / loop() / verify() meta-operations over agent calls
✅ Semantic memory search · BYOE vector store with cosine similarity over blackboard data
✅ Phase pipeline · Multi-phase workflows with human-in-the-loop approval gates; approvalTimeoutMs fail-closed timeout prevents indefinite hangs
✅ Confidence filtering · Multi-agent result scoring, threshold validation, and consensus aggregation
✅ Matcher-based hooks · Glob patterns on agent/action/tool for targeted hook filtering
✅ Fan-out / fan-in · Parallel agent spawning with pluggable aggregation strategies
✅ Agent runtime sandbox · Sandboxed shell execution with policy enforcement and approval gates
✅ Interactive console · TUI dashboard for live monitoring, agent control, blackboard/budget/FSM management
✅ Pipe mode · JSON stdin/stdout protocol for programmatic AI-to-orchestrator control
✅ Strategy agent · Meta-orchestrator with elastic agent pools, workload partitioning, and adaptive scaling
✅ Goal decomposer · LLM-powered goal → task DAG → parallel execution with runTeam() one-liner
✅ Context Throttler · Prune blackboard keys per agent scope before LLM calls — prevent context pollution
✅ Partition Planner · Assign non-overlapping focus areas to agents before DAG execution — no redundant research
✅ Coverage Gate · Recursive refinement loop — re-run decomposer for gaps until coverage score ≥ threshold
✅ Route Classifier · Short-circuit routing — classify goals as factual lookup vs. complex synthesis before planning
✅ Goal DSL · YAML/JSON goal definitions with cycle detection and topological compilation
✅ Agent VCR · Record and replay LLM/agent interactions for deterministic tests
✅ Comparison runner · Side-by-side adapter comparison with scoring, timing, cost analysis
✅ Coverage reporter · V8 coverage collection with threshold enforcement
✅ Job queue · Persistent priority FIFO with retries, crash recovery, pluggable backends
✅ Approval inbox · Web-accessible approval queue with REST API and SSE streaming
✅ TTL auto-eviction · purgeExpired() on-demand eviction; startSweep(intervalMs) / stopSweep() background timer (unref'd, default 60 s)
✅ WAL crash recovery · LockedBlackboard Write-Ahead Log survives process crashes; replayWAL() replays uncommitted ops on restart; compactWAL() for manual truncation
✅ Circuit Breaker · AdapterRegistry per-adapter CLOSED/OPEN/HALF_OPEN state machine; fallbackChain for automatic failover; CircuitOpenError; zero added dependencies
✅ OTel telemetry hooks · ITelemetryProvider BYOT abstraction — NullTelemetryProvider, CapturingTelemetryProvider, createOtelHooks() factory; plug in any OTel SDK without modifying adapters
✅ Transport layer · JSON-RPC 2.0 over HTTP with HMAC auth, TTL, node allowlisting
✅ Playground REPL · Interactive sandbox with mock agents for rapid prototyping
✅ Adapter test harness · Parameterized test battery for any adapter implementation
✅ IAuthValidator · Interface to decouple authorization from concrete AuthGuardian
✅ Kill switch · network-ai pause / resume — SYSTEM_PAUSED sentinel; doctor self-diagnostics; inspect metadata + audit trail
✅ Minimal mode · --minimal / NETWORK_AI_MINIMAL=1 — skips WAL replay and sweep for fast CI/test startup
✅ ASI Strict Mode · Opt-in proof-carrying actions, BFT consensus, auditor receipts, kill switch, trust-tiered context, cognitive caps
✅ Perpetual Runtime · Opt-in indefinite runs under operator-signed leases: dead-man switch, egress proxy, guarded paths, sandbox, sentry swarm, self-improvement pipeline, self-healing state, budget balancer
✅ TypeScript native · ES2022 strict mode, zero native dependencies


Why teams use Network-AI

Problem How Network-AI solves it
Race conditions in parallel agents Atomic blackboard: propose → validate → commit with file-system mutex
Agent overspend / runaway costs FederatedBudget — hard per-agent token ceilings with live spend tracking
No visibility into what agents did HMAC / Ed25519-signed audit log on every write, permission grant, and FSM transition
Locked into one AI framework 32 adapters — mix LangChain + AutoGen + CrewAI + Codex + Gemini + MiniMax + NemoClaw + APS + LangGraph + Vertex AI + Hermes + RLM + custom in one swarm
Agents escalating beyond their scope AuthGuardian — scoped permission tokens required before sensitive operations
Agents lack project context between runs ProjectContextManager (Layer 3) — inject decisions, goals, stack, and milestones into every system prompt
No regression tracking on agent output quality QAOrchestratorAgent — scenario replay, feedback loops, cross-agent contradiction detection, historical trend tracking
Long-running agents you cannot reliably stop Perpetual Runtime — out-of-process lease authority, dead-man switch, and guarded governance paths keep humans in control

Architecture```mermaid

%%{init: {'theme': 'base', 'themeVariables': {'primaryColor': '#1e293b', 'primaryTextColor': '#e2e8f0', 'primaryBorderColor': '#475569', 'lineColor': '#94a3b8', 'clusterBkg': '#0f172a', 'clusterBorder': '#334155', 'edgeLabelBackground': '#1e293b', 'edgeLabelColor': '#cbd5e1', 'titleColor': '#e2e8f0'}}}%%
flowchart TD
classDef app fill:#1e3a5f,stroke:#3b82f6,color:#bfdbfe,font-weight:bold
classDef security fill:#451a03,stroke:#d97706,color:#fde68a
classDef routing fill:#14532d,stroke:#16a34a,color:#bbf7d0
classDef quality fill:#3b0764,stroke:#9333ea,color:#e9d5ff
classDef blackboard fill:#0c4a6e,stroke:#0284c7,color:#bae6fd
classDef adapters fill:#064e3b,stroke:#059669,color:#a7f3d0
classDef audit fill:#1e293b,stroke:#475569,color:#94a3b8

App["Your Application"]:::app
App -->|"createSwarmOrchestrator()"| SO

subgraph SO["SwarmOrchestrator"]
    AG["AuthGuardian\n(HMAC / Ed25519 permission tokens)"]:::security
    AR["AdapterRegistry\n(route tasks to frameworks)"]:::routing
    QG["QualityGateAgent\n(validate blackboard writes)"]:::quality
    QA["QAOrchestratorAgent\n(scenario replay, regression tracking)"]:::quality
    BB["SharedBlackboard\n(shared agent state)\npropose → validate → commit\nfilesystem mutex"]:::blackboard
    AD["Adapters — plug any framework in, swap freely\nLangChain · AutoGen · CrewAI · MCP · LlamaIndex · …"]:::adapters

    AG -->|"grant / deny"| AR
    AR -->|"tasks dispatched"| AD
    AD -->|"writes results"| BB
    QG -->|"validates"| BB
    QA -->|"orchestrates"| QG
end

SO --> AUDIT["data/audit_log.jsonl\n(HMAC / Ed25519-signed)"]:::audit

> `FederatedBudget` is a standalone export — instantiate it separately and optionally wire it to a blackboard backend for cross-node token budget enforcement.
>
> `ProjectContextManager` is a Layer-3 Python helper (`scripts/context_manager.py`) that injects persistent project goals, decisions, and milestones into agent system prompts — see ARCHITECTURE.md § Layer 3.

→ Full architecture, FSM journey, and handoff protocol

---

## Install```bash
npm install network-ai

No native dependencies, no build step. Adapters are dependency-free (BYOC — bring your own client).


Use as MCP Server

Start the server (no config required, zero dependencies):```bash
npx network-ai-server --port 3001

or from source:

npx ts-node bin/mcp-server.ts --port 3001


Then wire any MCP-compatible client to it.

**Claude Desktop** — add to `~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json` (macOS) or `%APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json` (Windows):```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "network-ai": {
      "url": "http://localhost:3001/sse"
    }
  }
}

Cursor / Cline / any SSE-based MCP client — point to the same URL:```json
{
"mcpServers": {
"network-ai": {
"url": "http://localhost:3001/sse"
}
}
}


Verify it's running:```bash
curl http://localhost:3001/health   # { "status": "ok", "tools": <n>, "uptime": <ms> }
curl http://localhost:3001/tools    # full tool list

Tools exposed over MCP:
- blackboard_read / blackboard_write / blackboard_list / blackboard_delete / blackboard_exists
- context_pack — token-budgeted, relevance-ranked context brief for a task (use instead of dumping the whole board into your window)
- blackboard_search — ranked top-K search over blackboard entries (semantic when an embedder is wired, lexical otherwise)
- budget_status / budget_spend / budget_reset — federated token tracking
- token_create / token_validate / token_revoke — HMAC / Ed25519-signed permission tokens
- audit_query — query the append-only audit log
- config_get / config_set — live orchestrator configuration
- agent_list / agent_spawn / agent_stop — agent lifecycle
- fsm_transition — write FSM state transitions to the blackboard

Each tool takes an agent_id parameter, recorded as the source agent of every write. The MCP server's trust boundary is transport authentication (the bearer secret over SSE/HTTP, or local stdio): once a client is admitted, the server writes on its behalf with a server-held random identity, so any agent_id works and no shared token needs to be known. Caller-supplied agent_token values are ignored over MCP. In-process TypeScript code keeps per-agent tokens and namespaces via registerAgent().

Options: --no-budget, --no-token, --no-control, --ceiling, --board, --audit-log.


Use as a Claude Code Plugin

Network-AI ships as a Claude Code plugin — the MCP server wires in automatically, so every tool listed above becomes available inside Claude Code with no manual config.

Install from the self-hosted marketplace (zero approval needed):```bash
/plugin marketplace add Jovancoding/Network-AI
/plugin install network-ai@network-ai


That's it — `blackboard_read`, `budget_status`, `audit_query`, `token_create`, and the rest load as native Claude Code tools. Under the hood the plugin runs `npx -y -p network-ai network-ai-server --stdio` (stdio MCP transport), so it always uses the published npm package.

The repo root carries the standard plugin layout:

| File | Role |
|---|---|
| `.claude-plugin/plugin.json` | Plugin manifest |
| `.mcp.json` | Registers the Network-AI MCP server (stdio) |
| `.claude-plugin/marketplace.json` | Self-hosted marketplace catalog |
| `commands/` | Slash commands — `/network-ai:status`, `/network-ai:budget`, `/network-ai:audit`, `/network-ai:blackboard` |

Validate the manifests locally with `claude plugin validate .`.

**Gate Claude Code itself with AuthGuardian (hooks).** Every tool call Claude Code makes — shell commands, file edits, web fetches — can be audited and permission-gated through the same weighted scoring (justification 40%, trust 30%, risk 30%) Network-AI applies to swarm agents:```jsonc
// .claude/settings.json — see examples/claude-code-hooks.json for the full config
{
  "hooks": {
    "PreToolUse": [{
      "matcher": "Bash|Write|Edit|WebFetch",
      "hooks": [{ "type": "command",
                  "command": "npx -y -p network-ai network-ai hook pre-tool-use --mode enforce" }]
    }]
  }
}

--mode observe (default) audits every call to data/hooks_audit.jsonl without blocking; --mode enforce maps tools to resource types (Bash → SHELL_EXEC, Write/Edit → FILE_SYSTEM, WebFetch → EXTERNAL_SERVICE) and requires an AuthGuardian grant — denied calls escalate to you as an interactive prompt. --deny "rm -rf" patterns hard-block regardless of mode and are matched against the tool name and every string field of the tool input (e.g. Write.content, Edit.new_string, MCP tool arguments). --allow patterns match only the tool name and primary target. Invalid or backtracking-prone patterns make the hook exit 2, which Claude Code treats as a block, so a bad rule fails closed rather than silently disabling the deny list.


Use with OpenAI Codex

Network-AI also runs as an OpenAI Codex MCP server — in both the Codex CLI and the IDE extension. The same tools that load in Claude Code become available in Codex.

Add it with one command (uses the published npm package):```bash
codex mcp add network-ai -- npx -y -p network-ai network-ai-server --stdio


In the Codex TUI, run `/mcp` to confirm `network-ai` is connected.

**Or scope it to a project** — the repo root ships a `.codex/config.toml` so any trusted checkout picks the server up automatically. To register it globally instead, drop the same block into `~/.codex/config.toml`:```toml
[mcp_servers.network-ai]
command = "npx"
args = ["-y", "-p", "network-ai", "network-ai-server", "--stdio"]

…(正文过长,页面只展示前面部分,完整内容见仓库)

常见问题

7 问
答案由本站依据条目字段整理,不引用上游原文
Network Ai 怎么安装?

资料没有给出安装命令,请到官方仓库或文档按说明接入;这类条目多数是生态应用,或尚未发布可安装包。

Network Ai 怎么在 Cursor、Codex、Zed 里配置?

它的传输方式未标注,在客户端的 MCP 配置里填好启动命令和参数,保存后完全退出客户端再打开,配置才会生效。

Network Ai 收费吗?

本站不代收费用,也没有标注具体价格。是否收费取决于服务本身和背后的接口额度,正式使用前按官方说明确认。

Network Ai 需要 API Key 吗?

资料标注需要OAuth 授权认证,使用前准备好对应凭据,并按最小权限配置。

Network Ai 支持哪些客户端?

资料标注支持 Cursor、Codex、Zed;其他客户端只要能配置 MCP Server,也能用同样的命令或地址接入。

Network Ai 能提供哪些能力?

资料显示能力标签包括 multi agent、orchestration、langchain、autogen。具体工具清单以官方文档为准。

Network Ai 需要什么运行环境?

运行时为 Cross-platform。

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服务器信息以作者仓库与官方文档为准;分类、传输方式与鉴权方式的中文说明为中文整理,最近核验 未标注。