MCP Gatekeeper 16a9dcf1

MCP安全风控

提供方 adamksmith

安全风控 未标注 OAuth 授权 社区 / 第三方 Claude

MCP Gatekeeper是一个零常驻访问令牌代理,用于在AI编码代理(如Claude Code)和OpenBao/HashiCorp Vault之间提供有条件的秘密访问,通过硬件双因素认证确保安全。

一句话选型结论

按资料字段整理

MCP Gatekeeper 16a9dcf1 属于安全风控类 MCP 服务器,传输方式未标注,OAuth 授权,可直接接入 Claude,没有现成安装命令,需按官方文档接入。接入前先确认权限范围;涉及写入、删除或付款的操作,建议先在测试环境验证。

分类安全风控 传输方式未标注 鉴权OAuth 授权 部署方式未标注
GitHub 星标 0 仓库热度,无公开仓库时显示未标注
工具数 8 暴露给模型的工具数量
资源 / 提示词 0 / 0 资源与提示词模板数量
维护方 社区 / 第三方 核验等级 仅资料核对

工具与能力

安全风控
数量来自来源目录的标注,具体工具清单以官方文档为准
工具数量8暴露给模型可调用的工具个数
资源数量0可读取的资源条目
提示词数量0内置提示词模板数量

能力标签

支持客户端

适用场景

访问控制Python本地部署安全代理双因素认证AI编码秘密管理

安装与配置

未标注 OAuth 授权
上游未给出传输方式
  1. 1
    准备运行环境

    按官方文档确认运行环境(常见为 Node.js 或 Python),装好后再执行安装命令。

  2. 2
    安装服务

    复制上面的安装命令执行;命令里带占位符的位置,换成自己的密钥或路径。

  3. 3
    写入客户端配置

    在客户端的 MCP 配置里填好启动命令和参数,保存后完全退出客户端再打开,让新配置生效。

  4. 4
    验证是否可用

    连接成功后客户端会列出约 8 个工具,随便调一个只读工具确认能返回结果。

典型使用场景

3 类
按分类与标签整理的常见用法,具体以官方文档为准
资产与漏洞排查

盘点资产、扫漏洞、看暴露面。

日志与审计

汇总日志、查异常行为。

合规检查

按规则检查配置与权限是否合规。

选择建议

选之前先看这几条
按条目字段给出的判断,不替你决定用不用

值得选的地方

  • 资料标注 8 个工具,职责相对集中,接入后不容易误操作。
  • 已适配 Claude,换客户端不用重新研究配置。

先想清楚的地方

  • 没有现成安装命令,需要按官方文档自己填启动命令和参数。
  • 使用前要准备好OAuth 授权对应的凭据,并按最小权限配置。
  • 版本更新与行为细节以官方仓库为准。

更适合

  • 需要在安全风控场景里让模型直接调用外部能力的人。
  • 已经在用 Claude 的用户,接入路径最短。
  • 想先快速试一下、能接受在本地或自有环境跑服务的人。

不太适合

  • 不方便管理密钥或第三方授权的人。
  • 需要厂商级 SLA 和技术支持的生产环境。

同类对比

6 个同类
同分类里挑最接近的几条,字段以各自详情页为准
MCP 服务器工具数传输方式部署方式安装命令最后核验
MCP Gatekeeper 16a9dcf1当前 8 未标注 未标注 无 2026-05-17
Cyber Strike AI 75 未标注 未标注 无 2026-05-17
mcp-for-beginners 未标注 stdio · 本地进程 本地部署 有 2026-04-13
casdoor 未标注 stdio · 本地进程 本地部署 有 2026-04-12
kubeshark 未标注 stdio · 本地进程 本地部署 有 2026-04-11
Modelcontextprotocol C22988b0 未标注 stdio · 本地进程 本地部署 有 2026-05-17

服务器档案

安全风控
字段来自项目仓库与公开索引,中文说明由本站标注
提供方adamksmith上游标注的维护方 adamksmith
分类安全风控本站按上游分类展示
连接方式未标注上游未给出传输方式
鉴权方式OAuth 授权远程服务建议用最小权限凭据
维护方社区 / 第三方核验等级 仅资料核对
包名 / 运行时未标注 · 未标注本地安装时用到的包标识与运行时
部署类型未标注上游给出的部署形态
最近核验2026-05-17上游最后核验时间

详细介绍

8.4 KB
来自项目仓库与上游目录的原文,未做删改

MCP Gatekeeper

Zero-standing-access token broker for AI coding agents. Sits between Claude Code (or any MCP client) and OpenBao / HashiCorp Vault, ensuring no secrets are accessible without explicit human approval via a DUO push to your phone.

The Problem

MCP servers inherit whatever access the host process has. Connect Claude Code to your infrastructure and it gets the same credentials you do — permanently, silently, for the entire session. There's no consent model, no escalation path, no timeout. The current MCP ecosystem gives you two options: full access or no access.

MCP Gatekeeper adds a third option: earned access — tiered, time-bounded, and re-approved at every step up.

How It Works

MCP Gatekeeper implements a three-tier access model where every tier transition requires a DUO push notification to your phone. The AI agent starts with nothing and must ask for what it needs.```
┌─────────────────┐ DUO push ┌─────────────────┐ DUO push ┌─────────────────┐
│ No Access │──────────────▶│ Read-Only │──────────────▶│ Read-Write │
│ (default) │ authenticate │ (4hr TTL) │ escalate │ (15min TTL) │
└─────────────────┘ └─────────────────┘ └─────────────────┘
▲ ▲ │ │
│ logout │ │ auto-renews on expiry │
│◀─────────────────────────────┘ │ (DUO push) │
│ │ │
│ logout │ expires (hard) / deescalate │
│◀────────────────────────────────│◀─────────────────────────────┘
│ drops to RO, not No Access


### Consent Model

**Session-scoped consent (RO):** "Yes, I'm working." Auto-renews transparently when the 4-hour TTL expires. You approved a work session — reads shouldn't interrupt your flow.

**Task-scoped consent (RW):** "Yes, do this dangerous thing." 15-minute TTL, **non-renewable** — the RW token never auto-renews (enforced in code); when it expires the agent drops back to read-only and must explicitly re-escalate. Every write task requires a conscious approval decision.

**Scope:** Consent and token state live in a single server process and are global to it. Gatekeeper is **single-operator, single-process** by design — one process holds one shared RO/RW state; it does not isolate authorization per session or per principal. Don't front it with a proxy that multiplexes multiple clients into one process — they would share a tier.

### Token Hierarchy

No standing access to your secrets. There is exactly one permanent credential — the bootstrap token — and its only power is to *initiate* an MFA challenge. Three tokens, three policies, each with only enough access to reach the next step:

1. **Bootstrap token** — Injected by Vault Secrets Operator (VSO). Can only read `secret/data/claude/ro-login` and `secret/data/claude/rw-login`. Effectively inert without your phone.
2. **RO token** — Obtained via `claude-ro` userpass login + DUO push. Can read secrets within scoped paths.
3. **RW token** — Obtained via `claude-rw` userpass login + second DUO push. Can read and write secrets within scoped paths.

Even if the bootstrap token is compromised, an attacker can only *request* authentication. The DUO push goes to your phone. A compromised token becomes an alert system, not a silent exfiltration vector.

## Tools

MCP Gatekeeper exposes eight tools to the AI agent:

| Tool | Requires | Description |
|------|----------|-------------|
| `authenticate` | Nothing | Trigger DUO push to obtain RO token (4hr). Reads auto-trigger this, so explicit use is optional. |
| `escalate` | RO | Trigger second DUO push to obtain RW token (15min). Required before any write. |
| `deescalate` | RW | Revoke the RW token immediately and drop back to RO. Good practice after completing write tasks. |
| `logout` | RO+ | Revoke all tokens and drop to no_access. Use at session end for full disconnection. |
| `read_secret` | RO+ | Read a KV v2 secret. Uses RW token if held (bypasses RO deny rules), otherwise auto-renews RO. |
| `write_secret` | RW | Write a KV v2 secret. **No auto-renewal** — explicit escalation required. |
| `list_secrets` | RO+ | List secret keys at a path. Uses RW token if held, otherwise auto-renews RO. |
| `token_status` | Nothing | Report current tier and remaining TTL for held tokens. |

## Prerequisites

- **OpenBao or HashiCorp Vault** with KV v2 secrets engine
- **DUO MFA** configured as an auth method enforcement on the Vault instance
- **Two userpass accounts** (`claude-ro`, `claude-rw`) with DUO MFA enforcement
- **Three policies** scoping each token tier's access
- **Vault Secrets Operator** (optional, for Kubernetes bootstrap token injection)

## Configuration

Two environment variables:

| Variable | Description |
|----------|-------------|
| `VAULT_ADDR` | OpenBao/Vault API address (e.g., `https://vault.example.com`) |
| `VAULT_TOKEN` | Bootstrap token — minimal policy, can only read userpass credentials |

## Deployment

### Kubernetes (recommended)

Deploy as a pod in a dedicated AI namespace with the bootstrap token injected via VSO:```bash
docker build -t mcp-gatekeeper:latest .
# Push to your registry, deploy with your K8s manifests

The Dockerfile runs as a non-root user (mcpuser) and uses a multi-stage build with uv for fast installs.

Local Development```bash

export VAULT_ADDR="https://vault.example.com"
export VAULT_TOKEN="hvs.bootstrap-token-here"
python -m mcp_gatekeeper


## Design Principles

**Invisible, not forbidden.** Don't give the agent the option to be dumb. If Claude Code can see VSO pods, it will try to extract secrets from them instead of using the API. Hide infrastructure entirely rather than returning 403s that invite retry loops.

**Every failure mode defaults to no access.** DUO timeout → no token. Token expiry → no access. Network partition → nothing executes. Pod crash → session ends. There is no state where a failure grants more access than was intended.

**DUO lives server-side.** The 2FA gate is in the MCP server infrastructure, not the agent's prompt or context window. The agent can't see it, reason about it, or engineer around it. From its perspective: call the tool, either get a token or don't.

**Design for compromise.** Gatekeeper trusts its caller — it expects to sit behind an authenticating transport (e.g., an OIDC proxy) — so assume that transport is breached. What's the blast radius? Even then, a compromised caller can only *request* tokens; DUO push approval still goes to your physical device. The architecture treats every layer as already breached and asks "what's the worst that can happen?"

**Session state as authorization context.** Most MCP servers are stateless — same input, same output, every time. Gatekeeper maintains a server-side state machine that changes the behavior of every tool call: the same `read_secret` to the same path returns data or 403 depending on accumulated session consent, not on input parameters. DUO approvals are the mutations to that state. Unlike MCP's in-band `elicitation` — which flows back through the agent and is therefore manipulable — those approvals happen out-of-band, on a channel the agent can't see or influence.

## Project Structure```
mcp-gatekeeper/
├── src/mcp_gatekeeper/
│   ├── __init__.py
│   ├── __main__.py          # Entrypoint, env config, FastMCP server init
│   ├── tools.py              # Eight MCP tool definitions
│   └── vault_client.py       # OpenBao HTTP client, token lifecycle, DUO flows
├── Dockerfile                # Multi-stage build (uv + python:3.13-slim)
├── fastmcp.json              # FastMCP server configuration
└── pyproject.toml            # Python 3.13, fastmcp + httpx

License

Apache-2.0 — See LICENSE for details.

常见问题

6 问
答案由本站依据条目字段整理,不引用上游原文
MCP Gatekeeper 16a9dcf1 怎么安装?

资料没有给出安装命令,请到官方仓库或文档按说明接入;这类条目多数是生态应用,或尚未发布可安装包。

MCP Gatekeeper 16a9dcf1 怎么在 Claude 里配置?

它的传输方式未标注,在客户端的 MCP 配置里填好启动命令和参数,保存后完全退出客户端再打开,配置才会生效。

MCP Gatekeeper 16a9dcf1 收费吗?

本站不代收费用,也没有标注具体价格。是否收费取决于服务本身和背后的接口额度,正式使用前按官方说明确认。

MCP Gatekeeper 16a9dcf1 需要 API Key 吗?

资料标注需要OAuth 授权认证,使用前准备好对应凭据,并按最小权限配置。

MCP Gatekeeper 16a9dcf1 支持哪些客户端?

资料标注支持 Claude;其他客户端只要能配置 MCP Server,也能用同样的命令或地址接入。

MCP Gatekeeper 16a9dcf1 能提供哪些能力?

资料显示约 8 个工具;能力标签包括 访问控制、Python、Claude。具体工具清单以官方文档为准。

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服务器信息以作者仓库与官方文档为准;分类、传输方式与鉴权方式的中文说明为中文整理,最近核验 2026-05-17。