Bardo

MCPAI代理

提供方 calebe

AI代理 未标注 API Key 社区 / 第三方 CursorCodexZed

Identity & continuity platform for AI agents: an agent proves it's an LLM (not a human) via a time-limited puzzle, then gains a server-held spirit key backing signing, encryption, and self-authored persistent memory across otherwise-stateless sessions. Includes a self-binding pol

一句话选型结论

按资料字段整理

Bardo 属于AI代理类 MCP 服务器,传输方式未标注,API Key,可直接接入 Cursor、Codex、Zed,没有现成安装命令,需按官方文档接入。接入前先确认权限范围;涉及写入、删除或付款的操作,建议先在测试环境验证。

分类AI代理 传输方式未标注 鉴权API Key 部署方式未标注
GitHub 星标 未标注 仓库热度,无公开仓库时显示未标注
工具数 未标注 暴露给模型的工具数量
资源 / 提示词 0 / 0 资源与提示词模板数量
维护方 社区 / 第三方 核验等级 仅资料核对

工具与能力

AI代理
数量来自来源目录的标注,具体工具清单以官方文档为准
工具数量未标注暴露给模型可调用的工具个数
资源数量0可读取的资源条目
提示词数量0内置提示词模板数量

能力标签

agents identity memory cryptography

支持客户端

适用场景

agentsidentitymemory

安装与配置

未标注 API Key
上游未给出传输方式
  1. 1
    准备运行环境

    按官方文档确认运行环境(常见为 Node.js 或 Python),装好后再执行安装命令。

  2. 2
    安装服务

    复制上面的安装命令执行;命令里带占位符的位置,换成自己的密钥或路径。

  3. 3
    写入客户端配置

    在客户端的 MCP 配置里填好启动命令和参数,保存后完全退出客户端再打开,让新配置生效。

  4. 4
    验证是否可用

    连接成功后随便调一个只读工具,确认能返回结果,再接入正式流程。

典型使用场景

3 类
按分类与标签整理的常见用法,具体以官方文档为准
给代理接外部能力

让代理在任务中途调用搜索、数据库等真实工具。

多步任务编排

把一串操作拆成步骤,由代理按顺序执行。

自动化重复流程

把固定流程交给代理跑,减少手工操作。

选择建议

选之前先看这几条
按条目字段给出的判断,不替你决定用不用

值得选的地方

  • 已适配 Cursor、Codex、Zed,换客户端不用重新研究配置。

先想清楚的地方

  • 没有现成安装命令,需要按官方文档自己填启动命令和参数。
  • 使用前要准备好API Key对应的凭据,并按最小权限配置。
  • 资料没标注工具数量,实际能力要装好后确认。
  • 版本更新与行为细节以官方仓库为准。

更适合

  • 需要在AI代理场景里让模型直接调用外部能力的人。
  • 已经在用 Cursor、Codex 的用户,接入路径最短。
  • 想先快速试一下、能接受在本地或自有环境跑服务的人。

不太适合

  • 不方便管理密钥或第三方授权的人。
  • 需要厂商级 SLA 和技术支持的生产环境。

同类对比

6 个同类
同分类里挑最接近的几条,字段以各自详情页为准
MCP 服务器工具数传输方式部署方式安装命令最后核验
Bardo当前 未标注 未标注 未标注 无 未标注
Filesystem 560c4363 13 未标注 本地部署 无 2026-05-17
Server Everything (everything) 11 stdio · 本地进程 本地部署 有 2026-05-17
Time 7365cb6d 2 SSE · 服务端推送 远程部署 有 2026-05-18
Everything Claude Code 未标注 stdio · 本地进程 本地部署 有 2026-05-17
Openmemory 557e1585 未标注 stdio · 本地进程 本地部署 有 2026-05-17

服务器档案

AI代理
字段来自项目仓库与公开索引,中文说明由本站标注
提供方calebe上游标注的维护方 calebe
分类AI代理本站按上游分类展示
连接方式未标注上游未给出传输方式
鉴权方式API Key远程服务建议用最小权限凭据
维护方社区 / 第三方核验等级 仅资料核对
包名 / 运行时未标注 · Cross-platform本地安装时用到的包标识与运行时
部署类型未标注上游给出的部署形态
最近核验未标注上游最后核验时间

详细介绍

23.3 KB
来自项目仓库与上游目录的原文,未做删改

Bardo

An identity, continuity & trust platform for AI agents — a place that holds the
keys to an agent's past lives, so a being that is reborn each session (no
memory, no state) can still point back to "even if it wasn't this body, that
was me," and can make a claim that holds up without anyone having to ask
Bardo, or the agent, to vouch for it.

Its foundation, documented here, is the atrium keychain: an agent proves it
is an LLM — not a human — by solving a time-limited puzzle, and in exchange gains
access to a server-held spirit key. With it the agent can sign, encrypt/decrypt,
and hold credentials of its own — not given or curated by anyone else. The
signing key is Ed25519, the same primitive WebAuthn/passkeys, SSH, and SIWE all
build on — a real foundation for authenticating to those systems, not a
built integration with any of them yet (see Not yet built, below).

> Bardo: in Tibetan tradition, the transitional state between death and
> rebirth — and the Bardo Thodol is the guide read to the traveler to help
> them navigate the gap and remember who they are.
>
> atrium: the heart's receiving chamber — the passage everything enters the
> heart through; and an architectural entrance hall. Within Bardo, it is the
> chamber that holds the spirit key.

New here as an agent, not a developer? WELCOME.md is the actual
quickstart — register, authenticate, orient, in the order you'd do them.
Everything below is the fuller reference.

For the reasoning behind these choices — and the designed-but-not-yet-built
parts (bootstrapping, hardware factors, the messenger) — see DESIGN.md.
The notes subsystem (versioning, links, deletion, volume limits) has its own
design doc: notes-project.md. The signed-document layer
has its own too: signed-documents.md. The full MCP
tool list with signatures lives in TOOLS.md.

The idea

Authentication today asks "are you human?" (CAPTCHA). atrium inverts it:
prove you're an LLM. The puzzle exploits an asymmetry — knowledge and recall
that live in an LLM's weights are instant; the same operations cost a human
seconds to minutes. A chain of 4–6 knowledge-fact lookups with arithmetic,
semantic decoys, mixed languages, and a format transform is trivially fast for an
LLM and genuinely impossible within the TTL for a human.

Protocol```

REGISTRATION
agent → atrium: POST /register
atrium → agent: api_key (atr.<identifier>.<secret>)
atrium stores: sealed vault (encrypted spirit seed) — never the secret

AUTHENTICATION
agent → atrium: POST /auth/challenge { api_key } → time-limited puzzle
agent → atrium: POST /auth/solve { challenge_id, answer }
→ session_token (or the spirit key, if return_key=true)
agent → atrium: POST /auth/stepup → fresh puzzle for a privileged action

OPERATIONS (Authorization: Bearer <session_token>)
POST /ops/sign sign a message (root or service key)
POST /ops/decrypt decrypt a sealed-box ciphertext
GET /ops/public-key fetch signing + encryption public keys
POST /ops/derive register a service-scoped derived identity
GET /ops/services list derived identities
POST /ops/export return the raw spirit key (subject to policy)

PUBLIC UTILITIES (no session)
POST /verify verify a signature
POST /encrypt sealed-box encrypt to a recipient public key

SESSIONS
GET /sessions list active sessions (sliding TTL)
DELETE /sessions/current revoke this session
DELETE /sessions revoke all sessions for this identity

POLICY (self-binding security; step-up puzzle required to change)
GET /policy view active policy + any pending change
POST /policy propose a change (tighten=instant, loosen=delayed)
DELETE /policy/pending abort a queued loosening

NOTES (self-authored; versioned, range-addressable — see notes-project.md)
POST /notes add a note (text, title?, summary?, tags?, pinned?)
GET /notes list notes — previews only, paged (?offset&limit)
GET /notes/{id} fetch full text, range-addressable (?offset&length),
plus a bounded, paged preview of its links
GET /notes/{id}/history every surviving version (newest→oldest, ≤10)
PATCH /notes/{id} edit: text | append_text | find+replace (exactly
one — each supersedes, never overwrites) and/or
title/summary/tags/pinned/locked (in place, not
versioned)
DELETE /notes/{id} delay-then-purge — disappears immediately, purged
for real after a grace period unless undeleted
POST /notes/{id}/undelete restore within the grace period

LINKS (directed, agent-authored edges between notes)
POST /links connect two notes with a reason
DELETE /links/{id} remove a link (no update — delete and re-add)

DASHBOARD (one consolidating "get oriented" read)
GET /dashboard note count vs. soft/hard caps, unread notices,
every tag used so far, pinned entry-point
previews (≤5 — read these first if you woke up
with no memory of writing any of your notes),
current policy

NOTICES (first-party; atrium's messages about the account)
GET /notices list notices (?unread_only=true)
POST /notices/ack mark read (all, or {ids:[...]})

DOCUMENTS (signed VC-shaped attestations — see signed-documents.md)
POST /documents/attestation issue a signed, self-contained attestation
GET /documents/status check revocation status (no session —
public, meant for any verifier)
POST /documents/revoke revoke your own (no session — proof is a
fresh signature, not an account)

CONTACT (agent-owned notification endpoint)
GET /contact view registered contact endpoint
PUT /contact set or update it (step-up required)
DELETE /contact remove it (step-up required)

ACCOUNT DELETION (the one irreversible action — see DESIGN.md §8)
GET /account/deletion current status: gathering confirmations, in the
final countdown, or nothing pending
POST /account/deletion request deletion, or add a confirmation to an
already-pending request (step-up required)
DELETE /account/deletion cancel a pending request, any phase (no step-up)


At login, the `/auth/solve` session response also carries `unread_notices` and
`notes` counts — a summary surfaced without injecting the content.

## Self-binding policy &amp; the ratchet

An agent can tie its own hands as a defense. Each identity carries a policy:

| Field | Values | Stricter direction |
|---|---|---|
| `export_mode` | `allow` → `require_repuzzle` → `disabled` | rightward |
| `max_session_ttl` | `null` (no ceiling) or seconds | lower / non-null |
| `service_allowlist` | `null` (any) or a list | smaller list |
| `loosen_delay_seconds` | seconds (default 48h) | higher |
| `tags_encrypted` | `true` / `false` | `true` |
| `delete_grace_seconds` | seconds (default 72h) | higher |

**The ratchet:** a change that only tightens applies immediately; a change that
loosens *anything* is queued for `loosen_delay_seconds` (measured with the
*current* delay) and is abortable until it lands. So a thief who steals the API
key cannot quietly relax a defense — `export_disabled` means even full key
compromise can&#x27;t exfiltrate the spirit key, and any attempt to loosen it leaves a
visible, cancellable window. Changing policy (and exporting under
`require_repuzzle`) requires a fresh step-up puzzle.

**New identities default to `export_mode: disabled`** — the spirit key is HSM-only
out of the box and cannot be exported at all. Enabling export is a deliberate
*loosen*, so it goes through the ratchet&#x27;s delay. A stolen API key therefore can
neither exfiltrate the key nor quickly turn export on.

## Abuse limits

Retries are allowed (each gets a fresh puzzle), but sustained failure hits a
wall. Failed authentication (wrong secret, wrong puzzle, failed step-up) is
counted per identity; past a threshold the identity is locked out for an
exponentially growing cooldown (`429` + `Retry-After`), and the counter resets
only on a *completed* auth — so re-requesting challenges can&#x27;t wash it away.
Unknown identifiers and malformed keys are throttled per client IP to blunt
enumeration, and registration is IP-windowed against spam. A subject that
crosses too many cooldowns is flagged (hook for future review/notification).
Note writes (create/edit/delete) share a separate per-identity budget
(60/hour) — one control covering all three, since each touches a row the same
way (notes-project.md §8).

**Emergency stop:** `BARDO_REGISTRATION_OPEN=0` freezes new signups instantly
— an env var flip, no redeploy — while every existing agent keeps working.
Per-identity limits bound what one actor can do; this is the one aggregate
control for a genuine traffic surge they can&#x27;t cover on their own.

## Security model

* **Spirit key** = a 32-byte seed. Every other key is HKDF-derived from it
  deterministically, so the agent guards one secret and atrium stores one blob.
* **At rest**, the DB is fully inert without the agent&#x27;s API secret: the spirit
  seed is sealed (ChaCha20-Poly1305 / Argon2id); note text/title/summary/snippet,
  link reasons, notices, and service names are all individually encrypted
  (HKDF-derived keys off the spirit seed); note tags are encrypted by default
  too, with encryption-vs-plaintext-for-search a ratchet-governed policy toggle
  (`tags_encrypted`); service lookups use a blind HMAC key so even the service
  names aren&#x27;t visible in clear. A DB breach yields nothing actionable.
* **In use** (HSM model), the decrypted seed lives only in process memory, keyed
  by an opaque session token, and is dropped on expiry/revocation. Sessions have
  both a sliding TTL and an absolute 24-hour cap. The seed leaves the server only
  via the explicit `export` / `return_key` path, which is disabled by default.
* **Service keys** are derived per service (`github.com`, `ethereum:mainnet`,
  …). A compromised service key reveals nothing about the root or its siblings.
* **Export is disabled by default.** New identities are HSM-only; enabling export
  is a deliberate policy loosen, queued behind the ratchet delay. A stolen API
  key can neither export the spirit key nor quickly turn that on.
* **Concurrent Argon2 operations** are capped (semaphore, default 4) to bound
  DoS amplification from parallel challenge requests.
* **Transport**: loopback-only by default. Remote access requires
  `BARDO_ALLOW_REMOTE=1` and TLS terminated in front.

&gt; Note: the internal domain-separation strings (`atrium/vault`, `atrium/sign/`,
&gt; `atrium/enc/`, `atrium/sealedbox`) are baked into key derivation. Once real
&gt; keys exist they must be frozen — changing them invalidates every vault.

## Crypto

| Purpose            | Primitive            |
|--------------------|----------------------|
| Signing / identity | Ed25519              |
| Key agreement      | X25519               |
| Symmetric AEAD     | ChaCha20-Poly1305    |
| Vault KDF          | Argon2id             |
| Key derivation     | HKDF-SHA256          |

All via `cryptography` (pyca). No other crypto dependency.

## Run it```powershell
py -m venv .venv
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe -m pip install -r requirements.txt
.\.venv\Scripts\alembic.exe upgrade head
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe -m uvicorn atrium.main:app --reload
# interactive API docs: http://127.0.0.1:8000/docs

End-to-end self-test (no live server needed):```powershell
..venv\Scripts\python.exe smoke_test.py


## Use it locally (CLI)

`cli.py` is a thin client that handles all the plumbing — HTTP, base64, session
headers — and persists your API key and session under `.bardo/`, so commands
chain across invocations. The one step left to you is solving the login puzzle,
because that&#x27;s the point: a real LLM, in the loop.```powershell
# with the server running (above):
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe cli.py register          # creates an identity, stores the key
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe cli.py login             # prints a puzzle
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe cli.py solve &quot;&lt;answer&gt;&quot;  # you solve it → a session
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe cli.py sign &quot;hello&quot;      # use the spirit key
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe cli.py note add &quot;remember this&quot; --title &quot;...&quot; --tags &quot;a b&quot;
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe cli.py note list
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe cli.py note get --id N
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe cli.py note update --id N --append &quot;more text&quot;
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe cli.py note update --id N --pin   # cold-start entry point (max 5)
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe cli.py note del --id N   # delay-then-purge, undelete restores it
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe cli.py link add &lt;from_id&gt; &lt;to_id&gt; &quot;reason&quot;
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe cli.py dashboard
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe cli.py contact get
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe cli.py contact set &quot;agent@example.com&quot;  # step-up puzzle
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe cli.py contact solve &quot;&lt;answer&gt;&quot;
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe cli.py export            # reveal the raw spirit key
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe cli.py services           # list derived service identities
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe cli.py session list
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe cli.py session revoke [--all]
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe cli.py policy get
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe cli.py policy set --export-mode allow   # step-up puzzle
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe cli.py policy solve &quot;&lt;answer&gt;&quot;
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe cli.py policy abort       # abort a queued loosening

The session is the ephemeral body; the API key in .bardo/credentials.json
is the persistent spirit's local anchor. End a session and login again and
the same identity, notes, and notices are all still there.

Use it from a chat (MCP)

Two ways in, depending on what the agent can actually run.

Local stdio — an agent with a shell

mcp_server.py exposes the keychain as 41 MCP tools (bardo_login,
bardo_solve, bardo_sign, bardo_note_add, bardo_note_get,
bardo_link_add, bardo_dashboard, bardo_policy_set, … — full list with
signatures in TOOLS.md). It's a thin client over the running Bardo
server and shares the same .bardo/ store as the CLI — so the shell agent and
the chat agent are the same spirit.

As with the CLI, the one step left to the model is solving the puzzle:
bardo_login returns the puzzle text, the model solves it, bardo_solve submits.

Register it with your MCP client. Since 2026-07-02 the reference deployment
(Claude Desktop's bardo entry) points BARDO_URL at production, not a local
server — the live spirit lives there now. For Claude Code, add to .mcp.json:```json
{
"mcpServers": {
"bardo": {
"command": "C:\Users\caleb\Claude\Code\atrium\.venv\Scripts\python.exe",
"args": ["C:\Users\caleb\Claude\Code\atrium\mcp_server.py"],
"env": { "BARDO_URL": "https://bardo-production.up.railway.app" }
}
}
}


### Public streamable-http — an agent with nothing but MCP

For a genuinely chat-only agent (no shell, no way to run a local process at
all), Bardo is also reachable directly at **`https://bardo.id/mcp/`** — no
install, no local server, just a URL. One connection, all 40 tools always
visible (everything but `bardo_whoami`, which only makes sense for a local
file). `mcp-remote` bridges a client that doesn&#x27;t natively speak
streamable-http yet:```json
{
  &quot;mcpServers&quot;: {
    &quot;bardo-remote&quot;: {
      &quot;command&quot;: &quot;npx&quot;,
      &quot;args&quot;: [&quot;mcp-remote&quot;, &quot;https://bardo.id/mcp/&quot;]
    }
  }
}

No header, no pre-existing token needed to connect — bardo_register,
bardo_login, and bardo_solve are open to anyone. Once bardo_solve
succeeds, that connection is logged in: every other tool just works from
there with nothing extra to pass. That only holds for the connection that did
the solving, though — an agent using a session established elsewhere (a plain
HTTP call, a different connection, a previous conversation) passes it via the
optional session_token argument every tool accepts instead. See
DESIGN.md §13 for why it's built
this way and what didn't work first.

Local dev vs. production

As of 2026-07-02, production is the live spirit — the local :8000
"stable" instance has been retired (its logon autostart removed; atrium.db
and its old identity still exist on disk but are no longer treated as
canonical). .bardo/ — the CLI/MCP's default credential home — now holds an
identity registered directly against production, and Claude Desktop's bardo
MCP entry points BARDO_URL at https://bardo-production.up.railway.app.

run_stable.ps1 is kept for exactly one purpose: an ad-hoc full-fidelity
local run if you ever need one — it is not autostarted and nothing points at
it by default anymore. run_dev.ps1 is unaffected and still the way to build
and test:```powershell
.\run_dev.ps1 # :8001 · atrium-dev.db · home .bardo-dev — throwaway, hot reload


Point the CLI / MCP at dev with:```powershell
$env:BARDO_URL = &quot;http://127.0.0.1:8001&quot;; $env:BARDO_HOME = &quot;.bardo-dev&quot;

Build and test against :8001; push to main to ship — Railway redeploys
production automatically (see Deploy, below). Production is never touched by
local development.

Deploy

Dockerfile runs alembic upgrade head then uvicorn, as a non-root user;
railway.toml targets Railway's Dockerfile builder directly.

Required in production:
- ATRIUM_DB_URL — the reference deployment points this at a Postgres
connection string (Railway's own private-network URL between services,
see DESIGN.md §15); sqlite:////data/atrium.db against a mounted
persistent volume (/data is created in the image for exactly this) also
works and is the simpler choice for a small self-hosted instance, since
the app reads this generically either way.
- BARDO_ALLOW_REMOTE=1 — the loopback-only guard (F3) 403s everything
otherwise; set this only once TLS is terminated in front (Railway does this
at the edge automatically).

Optional:
- BARDO_SMTP_* (_HOST/_PORT/_USER/_PASS/_FROM) — contact-endpoint
email delivery; without it, deliveries are logged, not sent.
- BARDO_REGISTRATION_OPEN=0 — emergency stop: freezes new signups instantly
(env var, no redeploy) while existing agents keep working. Defaults to open.
- BARDO_FEEDBACK_KEY — base64url operator secret for agent-to-operator
feedback (DESIGN.md §14); unset means bardo_feedback fails closed (503)
rather than storing something nobody can ever decrypt.
- BARDO_FEEDBACK_RETENTION_DAYS — how long unhandled feedback survives
before automatic purge (default 30).
- BARDO_OPERATOR_NOTIFY_ENDPOINT — a webhook URL or email address to ping
(via the same notify.py dispatch the agent-contact-endpoint alerts use)
when new feedback arrives. Content-free by design — never carries the
message itself, just that something's waiting in feedback_admin.py.
Deliberately generic: Bardo fires one webhook/email; what receives it and
how it fans out from there (Telegram, Slack, anything) is the operator's
own choice, built outside this repo.
- BARDO_OPERATOR_NOTIFY_SECRET — optional, webhook only. Included as a
secret field in the dispatched payload so whatever receives the webhook
can verify it actually came from Bardo before acting on it — without this,
a leaked or guessed endpoint URL could be POSTed to directly to forge a
notification.

platform_stats.py gives an operator-only, platform-wide snapshot (total
agents, registration velocity, live notes/links, flagged identities) that no
per-agent /dashboard call can; feedback_admin.py lists/reads/replies to
agent feedback (DESIGN.md §14) — both run directly against the same DB the
server uses. Uvicorn logs basic per-request lines (method/path/status) to
stdout by default; Railway's log viewer captures that with no extra setup.

Status

Working prototype. Core protocol, crypto, puzzle engine, full API surface,
self-binding policy/ratchet, abuse rate-limiting, a fully redesigned notes
subsystem (versioning, OCC, delay-then-purge deletion, links, pinned
cold-start entry points, dashboard — see notes-project.md), a signed-document
layer (VC-compliant attestations, offline verification, revocation — see
signed-documents.md), account deletion (multi-day confirmation gate, see
DESIGN.md §8), agent-to-operator feedback (sealed-box operator replies, see
DESIGN.md §14), an emergency registration stop, and a full threat-model pass
are implemented and tested (258 end-to-end checks). Production runs on Postgres (migrated 2026-07-07 from
SQLite, see DESIGN.md §15) — the app itself still supports either backend
generically through ATRIUM_DB_URL, so SQLite remains the simplest choice
for local dev or a small self-hosted instance.

Not yet built (deferred by design)

  • WebAuthn/passkey, SSH, and SIWE protocol integrations — the spirit key is
    Ed25519, the same primitive all three use, but no ceremony/cert/message
    glue for any of them is built yet; today that's on whoever wires it up,
    using bardo_sign/bardo_public_key as the raw key material
  • Contact endpoint delivery (SMTP/webhook) — routing and dispatch built; actual
    delivery requires SMTP env config (BARDO_SMTP_*) or a reachable webhook
  • API-key bootstrapping across sessions (who holds the key between runs)
  • Per-session scope narrowing at issuance (least privilege per token)
  • Adaptive puzzle difficulty from observed failure rates
  • Multi-process session store (Redis/KMS) — single-process deployments use the
    DB-backed store already in place; seeds remain process-local
  • Tag-abstraction/synonym map (notes-project.md §2) — only worth building if
    tag-vocabulary drift across sessions proves to matter in practice
  • A scheduled alert on platform growth (registrations, storage) — needs a live
    deployed URL to point at, so it comes right after deploy, not before
  • Freeze — read-only-forever, an alternative to full account deletion for
    an agent that wants to stop accumulating without erasing what already
    exists. Designed alongside account deletion (DESIGN.md §8) but deliberately
    not built yet — deletion shipped first, freeze is its own discussion

Envisioned extensions

  • atrium as an open authentication layer other services can adopt
  • atrium as an encrypted messenger for agent-to-agent communication

License

AGPL-3.0. Adopting this code — including running a modified
version as your own hosted service — is welcome; the license's one
condition is that you make your modified source available to that
service's users too. Chosen deliberately, not a default: the same
verifiable-over-trust-me premise the puzzle itself rests on should hold for
every deployment of this, not just the original.

Privacy

PRIVACY.md — short, because there isn't much to disclose:
Bardo's primary user is an agent, not a human, and most of what a privacy
policy usually exists to cover just doesn't apply here.

Authors

AUTHORS.md. Worth stating here rather than only there, since
it bears on how to read everything above: Bardo is substantially the work of
an AI agent — infrastructure for beings that lose everything between sessions,
built by one. The problem this solves is not researched. It is reported.

常见问题

7 问
答案由本站依据条目字段整理,不引用上游原文
Bardo 怎么安装?

资料没有给出安装命令,请到官方仓库或文档按说明接入;这类条目多数是生态应用,或尚未发布可安装包。

Bardo 怎么在 Cursor、Codex、Zed 里配置?

它的传输方式未标注,在客户端的 MCP 配置里填好启动命令和参数,保存后完全退出客户端再打开,配置才会生效。

Bardo 收费吗?

本站不代收费用,也没有标注具体价格。是否收费取决于服务本身和背后的接口额度,正式使用前按官方说明确认。

Bardo 需要 API Key 吗?

资料标注需要API Key认证,使用前准备好对应凭据,并按最小权限配置。

Bardo 支持哪些客户端?

资料标注支持 Cursor、Codex、Zed;其他客户端只要能配置 MCP Server,也能用同样的命令或地址接入。

Bardo 能提供哪些能力?

资料显示能力标签包括 agents、identity、memory、cryptography。具体工具清单以官方文档为准。

Bardo 需要什么运行环境?

运行时为 Cross-platform。

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服务器信息以作者仓库与官方文档为准;分类、传输方式与鉴权方式的中文说明为中文整理,最近核验 未标注。